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Water markets provide one of the most promising institutional mechanisms for 
increasing access to irrigation from groundwater, particularly for tenants and small 
farmers.  While water markets are found in all provinces of Pakistan, they are most 
prevalent in canal irrigated areas of Punjab and in NWFP.  This study reviews the 
emerging literature on water markets and uses farm-level survey data to examine the 
performance of groundwater markets, with particular emphasis on Faisalabad District in 
Punjab and Dir District in NWFP. 
Findings indicate that, while large landowners are more likely to own tubewells 
and pumps, smaller landowners and tenants are more likely to rely on purchases from 
other farmers’ tubewells for access to groundwater.  The distance over which water can 
be transported provides a limitation to water market sales, but lined watercourses increase 
the distance over which tubewell water can be sold.  Contractual arrangements for water 
in the IFPRI study areas of Faisalabad and Dir districts include hourly charges, buyer 
providing the fuel plus a fee for wear and tear, and sharecropping for water.   
 
    While all types of irrigation--canal, purchased groundwater, and own tubewell 
water--are shown to increase yields of wheat, groundwater has a higher impact than canal 
water, and water from own tubewells, which provides farmers with the greatest degree of 
control, has a greater effect on yields than purchased groundwater.  Unreliability of 
access to purchased tubewell water was a problem for over half of water buyers in the 
study areas.  This analysis indicates that purchasers are more likely to have unreliable 
access to groundwater if they buy water from small-capacity, electric-powered tubewells, 
if they are young and own little or no land.   
 
  Policy measures to improve access to and reliability of groundwater through water 
markets include increasing the density of tubewells, especially by assisting small farmers 
to purchase tubewells; lining water delivery channels; and providing more reliable 
electrical power supply to rural areas.  Further research is needed on how water markets 
work in less favorable environments, such as those with salinity, waterlogging, or falling 
water tables, and to identify policy interventions that are appropriate under each set of 
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  1.  INTRODUCTION 
Irrigation plays a key role in Pakistan’s strategy for increasing agricultural 
productivity.  Surface irrigation has allowed the extension of cultivation into areas and 
seasons which lack sufficient rainfall for agriculture, and raised yields above what is 
possible under rainfed cultivation.  Groundwater irrigation is increasingly important in 
improving production, either alone or in conjunction with surface irrigation. 
Access to water in public irrigation systems (surface canals and public tubewells) 
is tied to ownership of land in the command area.  This land ownership entitles the farmer 
to a fixed turn of irrigation flow during a rotation cycle, to be used only on that land.  The 
rigidity of this system limits the productivity of surface irrigation and public tubewells, a 
limitation which is especially apparent in comparison with privately-managed 
groundwater irrigation, where farmers have more control of water timings (see Renfro 
and Sparling 1986). 
Access to privately-managed groundwater irrigation is dependent on investment 
in wells and pumping devices.  To the extent that large and wealthy farmers are most 
likely to own tubewells and small or poor farmers are unable to make the necessary 
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investment, the latter may be excluded from the benefits of highly productive 
groundwater resources. On the other hand, widespread private ownership leads to over-
investment in wells and pumpsets, particularly where holdings are small or fragmented.  
Institutional arrangements are needed to spread access to groundwater to other farmers, 
and to increase agricultural productivity and equity of irrigation water resources. 
Water markets, in which farmers buy and sell irrigation water, provide one of the 
most promising institutional mechanisms for increasing access to irrigation with private 
groundwater, for providing vertical drainage, and for increasing the efficiency of water 
use in irrigation systems (see Rosegrant and Binswanger 1992).  While such markets are 
not formalized or officially recognized, the sale of water from private tubewells is a 
growing form of water allocation.  The sale and purchase of public canal water supplies, 
though legally prohibited under the Canal and Drainage Act, is another type of private 
water market transaction which takes place in Pakistan.  These are, however, much less 
common than tubewell water sales.
1 
 This paper examines the nature and operation of groundwater markets in 
Pakistan.  It deals with the extent of water market development, who participates, the 
nature of transactions, the impact on productivity of irrigated agriculture, and the 
reliability of purchased irrigation services, with particular reference to Faisalabad District 
                                                 
     
1  In the IFPRI sample, only 2 farmers reported purchasing canal water, compared to 74 purchasers and 
10 sellers of tubewell water.  A WAPDA (1990) study of water trading and sale practices in 100 water-
courses found 2-3 times as many farmers involved in sale of water from private tubewells as from public 
(canal and tubewell) sources.  The difference in amount of water sold was even more dramatic:   
 
Buyers             Sellers           
Number    Total hours Number   Total hours 
Public sources               30                  161        21                       180 
Private tubewells          107    4,635     44    22,979 




in Punjab and Dir District in NWFP.  The final section suggests policy instruments for 
extending water markets and improving their performance. 
BACKGROUND 
Irrigation provides crucial water for agricultural production on over 80 percent of 
the gross cropped area in Pakistan.  Most of this irrigation comes through public canal 
systems, which, according to official reports, deliver surface water to approximately 70 
percent of the irrigated area.  However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s groundwater 
irrigation has been the most rapidly-growing source of irrigation: it now serves 
approximately 25 percent of the irrigated area, and provides over 36 percent of the 
irrigation water available at the farm gate (Pakistan: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 1991; Rana and Shafiq-ur-Rehman n.d.).  Groundwater has become a 
crucial input, both as a sole source of irrigation and as a supplement to surface irrigation 
in canal irrigation commands. 
From the mid-1950s to 1980 public tubewells provided the primary  source of 
groundwater irrigation development in Pakistan, under the Salinity Control and 
Reclamation Program (SCARP).  According to the World Bank (1984:i): "The 
Government of Pakistan opted for public control of an extensive groundwater pumpage 
program based on the rationale that this arrangement would enable the Government to 
meet multiple groundwater objectives in an efficient and equitable manner."  These 
objectives included: 
1.  providing vertical drainage to control waterlogging and salinity problems, 
especially in saline groundwater areas. 




3.  capitalizing on the economies of scale in pumping technology.  By providing 
water to a larger area than that controlled by single farmers, public tubewells 
could use larger pumps which are, in theory at least, more efficient. 
4.  reducing inequity in access to groundwater, by serving farmers with all sizes of 
holdings, regardless of financial resources for investment. 
 
In practice, institutional problems as well as technical difficulties resulted in 
disappointing performance of public tubewells.  Rising operation and maintenance 
expenses for public tubewells (which consumed 60 percent more than the entire national 
budget for canal operation and maintenance in 1983/84; see Aklilu and Hussain 1992:29), 
in conjunction with the poor performance of public tubewells in terms of timeliness and 
reliability of irrigation supplies, led the government to devolve responsibility for 
groundwater irrigation development from the public to the private sector.  The first two 
policies adopted in Pakistan’s Revised Action Plan for Irrigated Agriculture (WAPDA 
1982: 16) were: 
Recommendation 1: Future Development of Usable Groundwater should be 
entrusted to Private Sector, . . . 
Recommendation 2: Present SCARP Tubewells in the Usable Groundwater Areas 
should be phased out and Replaced by Private Tubewells. 
 
Pakistan’s experience suggests that private tubewell development can fulfill the 
objective of providing adequate vertical drainage, at least in areas of fresh groundwater 
(Chaudhry and Young 1990).  By 1982, approximately 80 percent of total groundwater 




12,500 public tubewells (World Bank 1984).
2  Increases in cropping intensities and 
agricultural productivity are greater under private tubewell ownership, primarily because 
private tubewells are more reliable (Johnson 1989:15; World Bank 1984:29).  The 
potential gains in technical efficiency derived from public tubewells using large-capacity 
pumps are offset, in practice, by frequent breakdowns and inadequate maintenance.  Most 
private tubewells provide greater water use efficiency by more closely matching water 
deliveries to crop needs, instead of adhering to the rigid schedules of public tubewell 
deliveries.  However, as the government closes public tubewells, the extent to which 
private groundwater development will benefit a large number of farmers and meet stated 
equity objectives remains an important question. 
There is increasing interest throughout much of South Asia in water markets as a 
means of increasing access to and use of groundwater for irrigation.
3   Much of the 
literature on this subject is based on field studies conducted in India and Bangladesh.  
This paper reviews the issues identified in this literature, in order to set the stage for an 
empirical study of the performance of water markets in Pakistan. 
                                                 
     
2 The large majority of tubewell development has taken place in Punjab.  In 1989/90, 88 percent of the 
private and 65 percent of the public tubewells of Pakistan were located in that province (Pakistan, Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives 1991:194). 
     
3 Water markets were a major topic in the World Bank Colloquium on How to Reach the Poor Through 




Although water sales from private wells are a longstanding practice, these 
informal arrangements have only recently been recognized and empirically examined 
(Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989:100-101).
4  In most cases in South Asia, water sellers 
are farmers who sell surplus water after meeting the needs of their own fields.  In Gujarat 
State in India, where water markets are highly developed, individuals and even private 
water companies are investing in wells primarily to sell water to others.  Tubewell water 
sales have become a profitable enterprise for small farmers in Uttar Pradesh in India 
(Shankar 1992a) and even for the landless under the PROSHIKA program in Bangladesh 
(Wood and Palmer-Jones 1990). 
In Pakistan, water markets are reported in all provinces, but are most active in 
Punjab, where the greatest groundwater development has taken place.  By 1975, over 30 
percent of tubewell owners in Pakistan reported selling water, but the fraction of water 
sold was very small (World Bank 1984:35).  A study by Pakistan’s Water and Power 
Development Authority in canal command areas of Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP found 
water sales in 43 of 100 watercourses (WAPDA 1990; see also Bajwa and Ahmad 1991).  
Sims’ (1988) micro-level study in canal-irrigated villages in the Punjab found that 
approximately one-third of farmers purchased groundwater from neighbors, while 29 
percent owned tubewells. 
The potential advantages gained from groundwater market development lie in 
improving utilization of tubewell capacity, increasing access to irrigation water supplies 
                                                 
     
4 There are numerous anecdotal reports and a growing number of studies of private water sales in Uttar 
Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh in India (Shankar 1992a, b; 
Pant 1991a, b; Kolavalli and Atheeq 1990; Kolavalli, Naik and Kalro 1992; Kolavalli, Kalro and Asopa 
1989; Saleth 1991; Shah and Raju 1988).  Perhaps the most highly-developed private water markets in 
India are found in Gujarat state, where farmers invest in wells and underground networks of pipes for water 




(especially among farmers with small or fragmented holdings), and lowering water tables 
in areas of waterlogging (see Chambers, Saxena and Shah 1989; Chaudhry and Young 
1990).  By providing water to other farmers, tubewell owners can use a higher proportion 
of their well capacity than they would otherwise use on their own holdings.  The 
availability of hired tubewell services reduces the need for other farmers to install their 
own wells.  Because water markets increase the use of installed pumping capacity, they 
can improve the economic efficiency of private tubewell irrigation. 
Private well ownership tends to be concentrated among larger or wealthier 
farmers because of their ability to mobilize the necessary resources, including personal 
finances, credit, and government connections for electricity supplies (Chambers, Saxena 
and Shah 1989; Johnson 1989; Chaudhry 1990).  According to the World Bank 
(1984:35), 70 percent of tubewells are owned by farmers with over 12.5 acres, and half of 
all tubewells by farmers with over 25 acres, which seems "to point toward an adverse 
effect of private tubewells on income distribution within agriculture."  Water markets 
make it possible for those without wells to use groundwater for irrigation.
5  The 
opportunity to sell groundwater can make it profitable for farmers to invest in wells even 
if their own holdings are too small to use the full pumping capacity (see Shankar 1992b).  
Dhawan concludes: 
the thrust of empirical research on groundwater markets, both in India and 
Bangladesh, has been to underscore the superiority of the institution of 
groundwater markets over the public tubewell system in catering to the 
irrigation needs of small and marginal farmers (1991:2). 
 
                                                 
     
5 In examining inequality of irrigation distribution, Gill and Sampath (1992) note the effect of water 




Shah (1991) argues that the expansion of irrigation through water markets 
provides increases in cropping intensity and the demand for agricultural labor, which 
ultimately benefit the landless and those who rely on wage labor for household income.  
Increased employment opportunity is one of the biggest advantages for landless members 
of pump groups in Bangladesh (Wood and Palmer-Jones 1990). 
Other researchers on water markets voice concern regarding who appropriates the 
gains from irrigation (e.g. Pant 1991b).  Groundwater is an open access resource, but 
ownership of wells and pumps is required to extract the water.  The prospect of 
exploitative "water lords" has been raised, especially where control over water through 
well ownership reinforces inequality based on land and other assets (e.g. Barah 1992).  
Shah (1991) suggests that well owners extracting monopoly rents from the sale of water 
is most likely to be problematic where the markets are not competitive.  Since water 
transactions are restricted by topography and the distance between source and field, 
market competition is more difficult to achieve.  However, Shah (1991) suggests that the 
availability of groundwater resources and alternative irrigation supplies (especially canal 
water), a high density of wells, and the presence of lined conveyance structures can 
reduce the sellers’ monopoly power and hence the price of water.
6   
Empirical research and anecdotal evidence indicate a variety of contract forms 
and wide range of prices in water markets.  Buyers may be required to provide labor, 
fuel, or a share of the crop, though the tendency is to move toward a cash charge per hour 
of water supplied as water markets develop (Chaudhry 1990, Shah 1991).   
                                                 
     
6  Pant (1991b: 277) also observed that the relative social and economic position of buyers and sellers 
affects water rates.  In Orissa State, India, small farmers selling water to large landowners charged less than 




Research has shown that the energy pricing structure has a major influence on the 
price of water in private groundwater markets (Shah 1985, 1991).  In India, a flat monthly 
rate based on the horsepower of the engine is associated with a much lower water price 
than a unit charge based on electricity consumption.  With the flat rate power tariff, the 
marginal cost of pumping is dramatically reduced, and therefore well-owners maximize 
their profits by pumping and selling as much water as possible (within the limitations of 
groundwater and power availability).  Water from diesel wells is consistently sold at a 
higher rate than water from electric wells of similar capacity because of the higher 
energy, capital, and maintenance costs. 
Kolavalli (1989) notes that transactions are not impersonal, but are part of multi-
stranded linkages in which buyers may give preference to relatives or those with whom 
they have other relationships, either through lower water rates or priority for service.  
This may be a way of dealing with high transactions costs for water sellers, particularly 
where water is provided on credit (see also Bardhan 1984).  Detailed observations on the 
relationships between buyer and seller and their effects on price and reliability of 
irrigation services are difficult to collect, and therefore have not been carefully examined 
in previous studies. 
While several studies of water markets have dealt with the price of water (e.g. 
Kolavalli and Atheeq 1990; Shah 1989), there has been less analysis of the reliability of 
purchased private irrigation services and its impact on productivity.  Chambers, Saxena 
and Shah (1989) cite farmers’ preference for purchased irrigation water above canal 
supplies as evidence of quality of service, but admit the difficulty of estimating adequacy, 




(1982) studied water trading and sales in Pakistan as a means of increasing farmers’ 
control over irrigation supplies.  The former used yields as a proxy indicator of quality of 
irrigation services; the latter used data on water and cash input use, cropping intensity, 
and gross income per unit area.  Both studies found that, while water purchases increased 
productivity over canal irrigation alone, they did not have as great an effect as tubewell 
ownership because tubewell ownership provided a higher degree of control. 
The following sections of this paper use empirical data to address both 
productivity and equity aspects of water markets in rural Pakistan.  Data on reliability of 
irrigation service and on agricultural production allow us to deal with the impact of water 
markets in greater detail than previous studies.  Household surveys on various aspects of 
agricultural production and rural poverty conducted by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) in Faisalabad, Attock, Dir, and Badin Districts during 1990 to 
1992 provide the basis for much of the analysis.  While the latter three districts were 
selected to represent the poorest infrastructure development in Punjab, NWFP and Sindh 
provinces, Faisalabad was included to represent a leading agricultural district (see 
Alderman and Garcia, 1991).  Data on household assets and agricultural production are 
available from 1986 to 1992, but the last full survey round, covering the 1990-91 
agricultural year, provides the greatest detail on agricultural production and irrigation, 
and will therefore be used in this paper.  Plot-level data on soil characteristics from all 
sample farmers are also available from 1992.  A re-survey of all tubewell owners and 
households participating in water markets, conducted in 1992, provides detail on these 




from the study areas to patterns of water markets indicated in other, more nationally 
representative studies, the findings are largely based on Faisalabad and Dir Districts. 
 
  2.  WHO PARTICIPATES IN WATER MARKETS?   
Water markets are most prevalent in the Punjab and Northwest Frontier Provinces 
of Pakistan, where groundwater irrigation is most developed.  Punjab contains the highest 
number of well-owners who sell water, as well as the highest number of private wells.  
However, in NWFP a higher proportion of well-owners are involved in water markets: 
according to NESPAK (1991) data, 25 percent of sample well-owners reported selling 
water in NWFP, compared to 22 percent in Punjab, 3.5 percent in Sindh, and 2.5 percent 
in Baluchistan.
7   
In the IFPRI study, water markets were found only in Faisalabad District of 
Punjab and Dir District of NWFP.  Attock District of Punjab is a barani (rainfed) area, 
and no Attock farmers in our sample owned or used tubewells.  The study villages in 
Badin District of Sindh are largely underlain by saline groundwater aquifers, which pose 
a serious constraint to groundwater irrigation and water market development.  Only one 
of the sample farmers from Badin owns a tubewell, but does not sell water from it; none 
reported buying groundwater.   
                                                 
     
7 Provincial figures reported in the NESPAK (1991) final report are a simple average percentage of well 
owners selling water across all districts.  The percentages reported here are a weighted average of 




The study areas in Faisalabad District lie within the command area of the Rakh, 
Jhang, and Gugera Branches of the Lower Chenab Canal, with a relatively flat terrain.  
Canals provide the sole source of irrigation to 53 percent of the cultivated area in the 
Division (including Jhang and Toba Tek Singh Districts), with groundwater irrigating an 
additional 13 percent of the area, and conjunctive use of surface and groundwater on 31 
percent of the area (Punjab Bureau of Statistics 1988).  Groundwater use in the district is 
less than recharge, but there are some problems with groundwater salinity.  Annual 
rainfall is under 500 millimeters, so cultivation is heavily dependent on irrigation.  The 
major crops grown in Faisalabad are wheat, sugarcane, cotton, rice, and maize.  Dir 
district has relatively hilly terrain.  With higher annual rainfall (averaging 1364 
millimeters), the area is less dependent on irrigation.  The main sources of irrigation are 
small-scale surface systems, with some tubewells.  The major crops are wheat, tomato, 
onion, and maize. 
The pattern of water market participation found in the IFPRI study, with greatest 
activity in canal-irrigated areas of Punjab and in NWFP, is largely borne out by data from 
the National Input Output Survey of Major Crops, which interviewed 1700 farmers 
distributed across all agroecological zones in Pakistan,
8 with the exception of 
Baluchistan.  Table 1 indicates that the highest proportion of farmers relying on 
purchased groundwater was found in the cotton/wheat zone of Punjab (Sahiwal, 
Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, R.Y. Khan, and Multan/Vehari districts), where over a third 
of all farmers buy tubewell water.  The mixed cropping zone of Punjab, which includes 
Faisalabad District, had the second highest proportion of tubewell water buyers, with 
                                                 
     




21.8 percent.  Although 16 percent of farmers in the barani zone of Punjab, which 
includes Attock, purchase groundwater and 36 percent own tubewells, tubewell use is 
concentrated in Jhelum District, and is very low in Attock District itself (Punjab, Bureau 
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Less than 3 percent of farmers use any groundwater in either of the zones in 
Sindh.  Of 138 farmers interviewed in the NWFP zone, only 5 percent reported pur-
chasing water from tubewells. 
The extent of water market participation among IFPRI sample farmers in 
Faisalabad and Dir districts is indicated in Table 2.  Nearly half of the sample farmers in 
Faisalabad District purchase tubewell water, more than twice the number who own tube-
wells.  Of the 22 sample farmers who own tubewells in Faisalabad, only 5 reported 
selling tubewell water.  In Dir, where groundwater irrigation is less prevalent, nine 
percent of all sample farmers purchase water, approximately the same proportion who 
own tubewells, but twice the number who sell tubewell water.  Water markets are most 
pervasive in Faisalabad, where groundwater purchasers or sellers were found in all six 
study villages (Table 3).  Within the villages, participation rates ranged from 0 to 16 
percent of farmers (0 to 100 percent of tubewell owners) selling water, and 0 to 81 
percent of farmers purchasing water.  Although all villages in Faisalabad fall within the 
command area of public canal irrigation systems, the watercourses in Jaranwala receive 
almost no surface water.  Thus many of the farmers in Jaranwala have invested in wells, 
often jointly with other farmers, giving it a significantly higher proportion of well owners 
(75 percent of sample farmers) than other villages.   
Only five of eleven study villages in Dir had any groundwater use among sample 
farmers, and groundwater markets were reported in three of those five 
villages (Table 4).  The water market is most active in  Katigram, where more 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What are the characteristics of tubewell owners and water purchasers?  Table 5 
presents a logistic regression (logit) model used to examine tubewell ownership among 
sample farmers in Faisalabad and Dir districts.  The logit technique allows us to examine 
the effect of a number of variables on the underlying probability of a dichotomous 
dependent variable, such as the probability of owning a tubewell.  In this model, land 
ownership, age of head of household, whether a household has a member who has 
worked or is working abroad, and dummy variables for Jaranwala village and Dir district 
(areas with less access to canal irrigation) are hypothesized to influence the probability of 
owning a tubewell.  The dummy variables are proxy indicators for availability of 
alternative water supply.  Other indicators of water supply, such as position of farm 
relative to canal systems and discharge in the watercourse, might refine the model, but 
are difficult to quantify and measure. Household wealth or income are not included in the 
model because it is likely that tubewell ownership has contributed to wealth or income, 
rather than the reverse.  Similarly, factors such as cropping pattern, which influences 
demand for tubewell water, are not included because no indicator is available for farmers’ 
desired cropping pattern, and availability of tubewell water has a stronger influence on 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5--Results of logistic regression model for tubewell ownership   
 
Independent       Wald 
Variables Units  Coefficient  T  Ratio  Statistic 
   
 
Size of land ownership  acres  .122 **  4.03  16.24 
Age of head of household  years  .051 **  2.34  5.48 
Relative abroad  dummy  1.668 **  2.15  4.63 
Jaranwala village  dummy  4.458 **  5.41  29.32 
Dir district  dummy  .036  .05  .00 
Constant                               -6.829 **  -4.35  18.90 
 
 
 Model Chi-Square  =  66.9  **  with 5 degrees of freedom 
 Number of observations  = 182.0 
 
 Classification Table for Tubewell Ownership 
 
                                                  Predicted              Percent  
                                 NOT OWNER       OWNER     Correct 
 Observed             
   NOT OWNER                  147                    7              95.4 
                     
   OWNER                           12                   16              57.1 
 
                                                                     Overall  89.6 
   
 
Source: IFPRI survey data, 1991/92. 
**  Significant at 5 percent probability level 




Results of this model indicate that land ownership has a strong positive effect on 
well ownership, implying that households owning more land are more likely to own 
wells.  The age of head of household has a significant positive effect on well ownership, 
perhaps because farmers invest in tubewells as the household becomes established.  
Households with a member currently working abroad or returned from abroad are also 
significantly more likely to own wells.  This seems to indicate that remittances are a 
source of financing for tubewell investment.
9  The dummy variable for Jaranwala village 
has a large and significant coefficient.  As noted above, the lack of alternative canal 
irrigation supplies has pushed these farmers to purchase tubewells, and joint investment 
has enabled even small farmers in this village to own at least a partial share of a well.  
The pattern of well ownership in Dir district, however, is not significantly different from 
that of Faisalabad district.  This model correctly predicts the well ownership status of 90 
percent of all cases.   
                                                 
     
9 The reverse direction of causality--that income derived from tubewell ownership has financed 
international migration--is unlikely.   Adams’ (1992) study of migration among households in the IFPRI 




Although small holding size is not an insurmountable obstacle to well ownership 
(as demonstrated by a high proportion of joint well owners with small holdings in 
Jaranwala village), it is a constraint to widespread tubewell ownership.  Tenants, 
especially those with no land of their own, are at a disadvantage in tubewell ownership 
because they do not have secure enough rights to land on which to install a tubewell, and 
are likely to face credit constraints for tubewell investment (see Malik, Broca and Gill 
1992).  In the survey on water markets, over 60 percent of groundwater purchasers cited 
the expense of purchasing a tubewell as the reason why they did not have their own 
wells, but 25 percent cited a lack of land ownership or too small a holding size as the 
reason for not investing in a well (Table 6).  Groundwater quality problems also prevent 
farmers from installing their own wells.  Water markets meet a need for water among 
those who have too little land, cannot afford tubewells, or find the investment not 
worthwhile, and those who have problems with the groundwater quality on their own 
land. 
TUBEWELL WATER PURCHASERS 
A logistic regression model, similar to that for tubewell ownership, has been 
calculated to identify factors which predict who purchased tubewell water during rabi and 
kharif of 1991-92 (Table 7).
10  Since remittances are less likely to have an impact on 
water purchases than on investment in tubewells, the variable for relatives abroad is 
omitted from this model, but a variable for season is added to see if there is a significant 
difference between rabi and kharif irrigation purchases.  As in the model for tubewell 
                                                 
     
10 Because of the small number of tubewell owners in the sample, it is not possible to develop a model to 




ownership, cropping patterns are not included  because they are determined largely by the 
availability of water.  The location of fields relative to the canal system and to tubewells 
whose owners are willing to sell, along with ground- water quality are likely to affect 
water purchases, but these factors are not included because the data are unavailable.
11 
Table 6--Water buyers’ reasons for not owning tubewells 
   
       District             
 Faisalabad  Dir  Total 
Too expensive  40  14  54 
 (54.1)  (93.3)  (60.7) 
Holding too small  11  0  11 
 (14.9)  (0.0)  (12.4) 
Not landowner  12  0  12 
 (16.2)  (0.0)  (13.5) 
Land not near canal  1  0  1 
 (1.4)  (0.0)  (1.1) 
Groundwater quality  6  1  7 
 (8.2)  (6.6)  (7.8) 
Only buy when own TW broken  3  0  3 
 (4.1)  (0.0)  (3.4) 
Purchase as supplement only  1  0  1 
 (1.4)  (0.0)  (1.1) 
Total number of water buyers  74  15  89 
   
Source:  IFPRI survey data, 1992. 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are percentage of water buyers. 
                                                 
     
11 Tubewell ownership was not included in the model because of the high multicollinearity between land 
ownership and tubewell ownership.  Similarly, operational holding size was not included because it is 
highly correlated with land ownership.  An alternative specification of the model, with operational holding 




Table 7--Results of logistic regression model for tubewell water purchase 
   
Independent       Wald 
Variables Units  Coefficient  T  Ratio  Statistic 
   
 
Size of land ownership  acres  - .039 **  -2.28  5.22 
Age of head of household  years  - .031 **  -3.30  10.87 
Season dummy  -  .355  -1.24  1.54 
Jaranwala village  dummy  -1.398 **  -3.38  11.46 
Dir district  dummy  -3.262 **  -8.15  66.50 
Constant   2.250  **  3.98  15.82 
  
 
 Model Chi-Square  =  118.4 **  with 5 degrees of freedom 
 Number of observations  =  352.0 
 
 
 Classification Table for Tubewell Ownership 
 
                                            Predicted                     Percent 
 NOT  BUYING  BUYING  Correct 
 
 Observed             
   NOT BUYING  221  31  87.7 
                     
   BUYING  36  64  64.0 
 
      Overall  81.0 
   
 
Source:  IFPRI survey data, 1990-1992. 
**  Significant at 5 percent probability level 




This model shows that, whereas the size of land ownership and the age of 
household head have a strong positive effect on tubewell ownership, these variables have 
a significant negative effect on water purchases.
12  Thus younger households with less 
land are more likely to purchase groundwater than older households owning substantial 
amounts of land.  Tenants are likely to be dependent on other households’ tubewells, as 
well as other households’ land, for their cultivation.  Farmers in Dir are significantly less 
likely to purchase groundwater than those in Faisalabad, in part because of the lower 
availability of tubewells in Dir.
13  Farmers in Jaranwala are also significantly less likely 
to purchase water.  In this village joint ownership, rather than water markets, provides 
small farmers with access to groundwater.  Because alternative sources of irrigation are 
not available, farmers in that village seek to assure themselves of access to groundwater 
by investing in wells rather than depending on groundwater purchases.  The season does 
not have a significant effect on water purchases: 30 percent of farmers reported 
purchasing irrigation in kharif, compared to 25 percent in rabi. 
Land ownership and age are indicators of overall status of farm households.  
Investment in tubewells are not made for prestige, but the status of households can enable 
them to mobilize the resources needed for tubewell investment, including financial 
resources and government assistance (such as electricity connections).  Therefore, it is 
                                                 
     
12 In a logit model for groundwater purchasing, using cross-sectional survey data from 5 states in India, 
Saleth (1991) also found a significant negative effect of farm size on likelihood of purchasing in 3 of 5 
states.  The other two states are characterized by very small and fragmented holdings and higher average 
rainfall.  Thus the need for supplemental groundwater was less, and the larger farmers in those states were 
as likely to purchase groundwater as small farmers. 
     
13 The effect of number and density of tubewells in a village was tested in an alternate specification of 
the model.  Tubewell density has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of water purchases, both in 
addition to the dummy variables for Dir and Jaranwala, and without the dummy variables included.  The 
variable for tubewell density is not included in the final model because there are multicollinearity problems 
when it is included along with the dummy variables for location, and tubewell density does not explain as 




not surprising that higher-status households are more likely to own wells, and lower-
status households are more likely to rely on tubewell water purchases.
14  However, not 
only low-status households purchase water: 7 of 28 tubewell owners in the IFPRI sample 
also purchase water.  Water purchases may provide a backup when a farmer’s own well is 
not functioning, or may be used to irrigate land that cannot be served by a farmer’s well.  
In several cases, farmers preferred buying water to operating their own wells because 
purchased water from electric-powered wells was cheaper than using their own tractor-
powered tubewells. 
Results of these model indicate that, whereas private tubewells are likely to be 
owned by large farmers, water markets improve equity of groundwater use by making 
water available to small landowners or tenants and younger households--those farmers 
who are least likely to own tubewells.  In Faisalabad, where water markets are most 
active, they provide the only access to groundwater for approximately half of the farmers 
who own less than 12.5 acres. 
                                                 
     
14 A comparable pattern of larger landowners owning wells and smaller landowners purchasing tubewell 
water, based on National Input Output Survey data from the Punjab mixed cropping zone, is shown in 




3.  RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN WATER BUYERS AND SELLERS  
PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Water markets are not perfectly competitive markets in which buyers are free to 
choose among a number of sellers.  In many areas there are not a large number of water 
sellers, and, under most conditions prevailing in Pakistan, tubewell irrigation water is not 
a commodity which can be transported far from the source to the area of application.  
Conveyance losses between the tubewell and the field restrict purchasers to buying from 
tubewells located in close proximity of their fields.  The distance over which it is feasible 
and economically viable to transmit water depends on the soils, topography, and type of 
channel used to convey the water.  In the IFPRI study, the average distance between the 
tubewell and purchasers’ fields was 600 meters in Faisalabad District, and 180 meters in 
Dir, which has more undulating topography.  Use of lined watercourses or field channels, 
which have lower transmission losses than unlined channels, increases the distance over 
which water can be transported.  Ten of the thirteen cases in which the distance between 
source and fields was over 1000 meters used lined watercourses (including one case in 
which water travelled down 3 kilometers of lined watercourse between the well and 
field).  
Lined canals and pipes ensure that water purchasers receive more of the water 
they pay for from the tubewell, and permit sales to a wider potential number of fields 
from each tubewell.
15  Thus, they go hand in hand with the development of competitive 
water markets.  They allow purchasers to obtain water within a wider radius of their 
                                                 
     
15 Underground pipes can even, to some extent, overcome topographic limitations to water sales, by 
enabling water to reach fields at a higher level than the 




fields, thereby increasing the number of potential suppliers.  Shah and Raju (1988) report 
that as competitive water markets developed in Gujarat state, India, tubewell water sellers 
who wanted to maintain clients install lined conveyances to ensure that water reaches as 
many buyers as possible with low losses.   
Despite these advantages of water markets, there has been little private investment 
in lining or pipes in the IFPRI sample areas.  Four farmers reported using lined field 
channels to convey purchased tubewell water part of the way (though in two of these 
cases the lined field channels were only the first 20 meters from the tubewell).  Three 
sellers used underground pipes, which have the lowest conveyance losses.  Pukka (lined) 
watercourses are used more frequently than lined field channels or pipes because 
watercourse lining results from government and collective farmer investment, while 
lining field channels or installing pipes requires considerable private investment. 
Farmers use watercourses for tubewell water despite the Canal and Drainage Act 
provision that all who do so are assessed the water rate for canal irrigation use.  A 
NESPAK (1991) study suggests that this law restricts the sale of tubewell water, and 
recommends allowing farmers to use watercourses for tubewell water without charge to 
encourage water markets and the mixing of marginal-quality tubewell water with fresh 
canal water supplies.  The Canal and Drainage Act further restricts transporting tubewell 
water by prohibiting farmers from carrying water across public watercourses.  It may be 
worth lifting this restriction, provided the pipes or other structures used to carry the 




Renfro’s (1982) study notes an association between private tubewells and 
collective activity among farmers, particularly with regard to watercourse lining.
16  
Renfro and Sparling (1986:206) suggest the reason for this is that "Farmers with 
cooperative neighbors are more likely to invest in tubewells, and the presence of private 
tubewells gives farmers new reasons to cooperate with each other."  However, this 
explanation omits the role of watercourse lining in reducing transmission losses of high-
value groundwater.  An alternative explanation is that, with tubewell use in general, and 
water market sales in particular, farmers recognize the value of canal lining and have 
greater incentive to reduce water losses.  With lined watercourses, tubewell water can be 
conveyed over a greater distance between the well and fields, thus expanding the 
potential market from tubewells along the watercourse.  Renfro and Sparling (1986:206) 
argue that watercourses with private tubewells are less in need of lining because they 
have additional sources of water.  However, watercourse rehabilitation not only 
conserves canal water, but by reducing transmission losses of tubewell water, lining can 
also encourage the development of competitive water markets.  Therefore, in areas where 
watercourse lining is to be done, it may be appropriate to give priority to lining 
watercourses with private tubewells as a means of fostering water markets.
17 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Physical proximity is not the only relevant relationship which influences the 
development of competitive water markets.  Social relationships between buyer and seller 
                                                 
     
16 Under the On-Farm Water Management projects implemented by the Government of Pakistan with 
USAID and World Bank assistance, farmers are required to organize into Water Users’ Associations in 
order to receive government assistance for watercourse improvement (see Byrnes 1992).   
     
17 Lining watercourses will also reduce groundwater recharge to some extent, and thus reduce 




may also restrict the sale and purchase of groundwater if tubewell owners are only 
willing to sell to close relatives or those with whom they have other ties.  This does not 
appear to be a problem in the IFPRI study areas.  Only 22 percent of water market 
transactions in Faisalabad District were between close relatives.  Approximately one third 
(37 percent) of transactions were between members of the same biradari, which repre-
sents a broader social grouping.  Sale of tubewell water between kin is even more rare in 
Dir, where only 2 percent of transactions were between close relatives or biradari 
members.  There, water market transactions were more likely to follow patron-client ties, 
with 37 percent of sales reported between landlord and sharecropper (compared to less 
than 1 percent in Faisalabad District). 
As noted above, selling water to relatives is a means of controlling transactions 
costs and ensuring fee repayment.  Relatives may also have the closest land holdings, due 
to inheritance patterns.  However, transactions costs may be higher with relatives, either 
because of quarrels or difficulty in collecting payments.  Shah (1992) hypothesizes that as 
water markets develop, they become de-personalized.  This seems to have taken place in 
the study areas, because personal relationships neither restrict access to groundwater nor 
are shown to have a significant effect on the reliability of deliveries, as discussed below. 
 
  4.  NATURE OF WATER MARKET CONTRACTS 
A flat charge per hour of pumping is the most common form of water market 
contract in both Faisalabad and Dir districts (Table 8).  This type of arrangement occurs 
under diesel, tractor, and electric-powered pumpsets.  Water from diesel pumpsets in 




and motor oil for the pump, and pays an additional fee of Rs 4 to Rs 6 per hour to the 
well owner to cover the wear and tear on the engine.  Sharecropping contracts for water 
are used under both diesel and electric tubewells in Dir. 
 
Table 8--Water market contracts, by type of pump   
            Type of Pump            
 Diesel  Tractor  Electric  Total   
Faisalabad District 
 
Flat charge per hour  9  19  44  72 
Buyer brings fuel  18  0  0  18 
Share of crop  0  0  0  0 
             




Flat charge per hour  13  0  0  13 
Buyer brings fuel  0  0  0  0 
Share of crop  2  0  6  8 
         
Total 15  0  6  21 
   
Source:  IFPRI survey data, 1992. 
Note:  Table includes number of sellers’ and buyers’ responses about type of contract. 
 
 
Prices under the hourly charge system range from Rs 14 to Rs 80 per hour, 
depending on the pump type, capacity, and location (see Table 9).  The higher price of 
water from tractor tubewells reflects the higher cost of operating this type of pump.  The 
average price of water under the hourly charge system is approximately the same for 
diesel and electric tubewells, although the former are usually more expensive to operate.  
The average capacity of the electric tubewells is higher, though, so the cost per 




the purchasers from diesel tubewells is slightly higher under the buyer-brings-fuel system 
than under the flat hourly charge.  Water sellers with diesel pumps are apparently only 
recovering their own costs under either type of contract.
18  The sellers’ transactions costs 
in acquiring the fuel and operating or supervising the operations of the pump are 
presumably higher under the hourly charge contracts, but there may be an unwillingness 
to let some purchasers operate the pumps themselves under the buyer-brings-fuel system.  
Among IFPRI sample villages, the buyer-brings-fuel contract was only found in 
Jaranwala, where there is also a high incidence of joint ownership of wells.  However, 
this type of contract is also reported in other areas with conjunctive canal and tubewell 
irrigation, such as in southern Punjab. 
All water transactions under hourly charge contracts in Dir are found in Khanpur.  
The price is Rs 40 to 80 per hour, which is higher, on average, than in 
Faisalabad.  Several factors could account for the higher price in Khanpur: the 
well from which most farmers purchase is large-capacity, powered by a 113-horsepower 
truck engine, and therefore more expensive to operate.
19  Irrigation water is also more 
scarce in Dir than in Faisalabad, where canal water is more readily available and 
groundwater tables are generally higher.  A final consideration may be that most water 
purchasers in Khanpur are buying water from their landlord, whereas that is only found in 
one case in Faisalabad.   
                                                 
     
18 Unfortunately, much of the information on price of purchased tubewell water comes from water 
buyers, rather than from the sellers.  There are thus not enough data on tubewell operations costs and water 
delivery rates to determine the profit margin for water sales or the exact price per unit water pumped. 
     
19 The price per horsepower is lower in Dir than Faisalabad, but this may be misleading because the 
relationship between horsepower and water delivery is not linear, particularly when comparing the pumpset 




Table 9--Average cost of tubewell water, by type of pump and contract   
              Type of Pump              
 Diesel  Tractor  Electric     
Faisalabad District 
 
Flat charge (Rs per hour)  29.44  43.95  27.82  
 (8.08)  (7.56)  (7.77) 
  





Flat charge (Rs per hour)  49.23  n.a.  n.a. 
 (17.54) 
 
Share of crop (percent)  25.00  n.a.  23.15 
 (0.00)    (2.31) 
   
Source:  IFPRI survey data, 1992. 
Note:  Costs computed from sellers’ and buyers’ responses. 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
n.a.    not applicable. 
 
 
A larger sample of water sellers and purchasers under different ecological and 
socioeconomic conditions would be necessary to estimate the effect of these factors on 
the cost of private tubewell water.  It does not appear, however, that the prices reported 
under the hourly rate or buyer-brings-fuel type of contracts represent a large profit to the 
tubewell owner.  Thus, concerns over water sellers appropriating the value of 
groundwater do not seem justified, particularly in the Faisalabad area. 
Sharecropping contracts for tubewell water are only applied to tomato, onion, and 
some maize cultivation in Dir.  The standard rate is 25 percent of the crop.  Three water 
sellers reported giving a different rate to their tenants: 20 percent as the share for the 
water (in addition to the share for the land), or 50 percent for the land and water 




the greater prevalence of sharecropping for land in that area than in Faisalabad.  
Sharecropping contracts for water are also reported for rice and berseem crops in other 
regions (Chaudhry 1990; Dr. Muhammad Jameel Khan, personal communication, March 
1992).  The extent of crop share contracts for water may be underestimated where the 
landlord supplies both land and tubewell water.  While tubewell irrigation may then be 
considered as one of the inputs which the landlord provides (such as fertilizer or plowing 
services), to do so masks the importance of timing and reliability of irrigation service in 
the overall production process. 
It is noteworthy that sharecropping for tubewell water is practiced under the 
cultivation of crops such as tomatoes, onions, or rice, which are sensitive to moisture 
stress at critical periods.  In sharecropping contracts, the water seller has a stake in the 
outcome of the crop, and a share in the risk if the water supply does not meet crop needs.  
Therefore, the seller has an incentive to supply tubewell water in an adequate and timely 
manner.  This is not as critical for crops less susceptible to the timing of irrigation, or 
where alternate sources of irrigation are readily available.  Chaudhry (1990) and Shah 
(1991) have suggested that, as water markets develop, there is a tendency to move toward 
cash contracts.  If, however, sharecropping for water offers a greater incentive for sellers 
to provide reliable irrigation service, this type of contract may remain for water-sensitive 
crops.  Further empirical research on the provision of tubewell water in different 
agroecological zones and for different crops is necessary to establish whether risk-sharing 




5.  AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY UNDER WATER MARKETS 
Previous studies have shown clear productivity gains to farmers purchasing 
groundwater over those using only public canal or public tubewell supplies, but the gains 
were much less than those obtained by tubewell owners.  The wheat and cotton yield 
increases of tubewell water purchasers (compared to those with canal water only) were 
half as great as the yield increases for tubewell owners in Freeman, Lowdermilk and 
Early’s (1978) study.  For rice the gap was narrower: water purchasers obtained 78 
percent of the yield increases of tubewell owners (see Table 10).
20 
A study of private tubewells by WAPDA (1980, cited in World Bank 1984) found 
that overall cropping intensity and the proportion of area under water-consumptive crops 
was higher for tubewell owners than for water purchasers.  There was also a yield gap 
between water purchasers and tubewell owners for sugarcane, rice, wheat, and vegetables 
(Table 11).  Part of the difference in yields may be due  to lower applications of irrigation 
water and complementary inputs such as fertilizer and insecticides by tubewell 
purchasers than by owners (even though tubewell purchasers used more inputs and had 
higher yields than non-users for almost all crops).  Renfro (1982) found that the cropping 
intensities, the proportion of area 
                                                 
     
20 A WAPDA (1990) study also assesses the productivity impact of purchased water.  However, the 
yield differentials are based on farmers’ assessments of what their yields would be with and without 
privately purchased water, and are thus not as reliable as comparisons of actual yields of farmers with and 




Table 10--Average yields of major crops, by water source in Freeman, Lowdermilk 
             and Early’s (1978) study.   
 Canal  Public  Purchased  Own 
Crop Only  Tubewell  Tubewell  Tubewell 
   
 (kg/acre) 
 
Wheat 672  747  784  896 
Rice 522  709  784  859 
Cotton 261  299  373  485   
Source:  D. M. Freeman, M. K. Lowdermilk, and A. C. Early.  "Farm irrigation constraints and farmers’ 
responses:  Comprehensive field survey in Pakistan".  (Water Management Technical Report No. 48-E, 
Volume V, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, 1978). 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































under water-consumptive crops, and the gross income per acre achieved by tubewell 
water purchasers more closely approximated that of farmers who only received canal 
water than that of tubewell owners, even though their cash and labor inputs were virtually 
as high as those of tubewell owners (Table 12). 
In part, water buyers may have lower cropping intensities and yields than 
tubewell owners because buyers choose to use less water due to the cost of purchased 
tubewell water.  However, the price of water for tubewell purchasers in the IFPRI sample 
was not much greater than the cost to tubewell owners (except for owners of electric 
pumpsets with fixed electricity charges, who face a very low marginal cost and therefore 
have an incentive to pump as much water as can be used).  Whether tubewell water 
purchasers use less groundwater based on an input allocation decision or supply 
constraints is unclear.  As discussed below, there are numerous occasions on which 
tubewell water is not available to water buyers at any cost, despite their demand for it.  
The lower reliability of purchased tubewell water compared to owned tubewell water is 
likely to be a major contributor to any yield or income gap between tubewell owners and 
water purchasers.  Renfro (1982:83) concludes that, in comparison with water purchasers, 
"obviously actual sampled tubewell owners can exert more control over water supplies 
with favorable impacts on productivity." 
The differences in cropping pattern between tubewell owners, water purchasers, 
and non-users of tubewell water are not as clear in the IFPRI sample 
villages as in the WAPDA (1980) and Renfro (1982) studies.  Table 13 examines 
the cropping pattern in Faisalabad and Dir districts by source of irrigation.   




Table 12--Input use and agricultural productivity in Renfro’s (1982) study   
 Canal  Water  Tubewell  Tubewell 
 Only  Buyers  Owners  Total   
Gross crop income  3018    3475    4659  3297 
(Rs/acre) (1081)  *  (1632)  *  (2029)  (1453) 
 
Canal  water  use/  26.3   26.2   25.2  26.0 
acre (acre minutes)  (9.5)    (5.6)    (6.7)  (9.2) 
 
Tubewell water use/  0.0    14.2    31.4  7.9 
acre (acre minutes)  (0.0)  *  (13.3)  *  (21.9)  (14.9) 
 
Cash input expenditure  309    385    388  344 
(Rs/acre) (156)    (158)    (86)  (198) 
 
Labor  use  73.8   76.2   75.5  74.0 
(mandays/acre) (37.8)    (35.4)    (46.4)  (37.3) 
 
Cropping  intensity  160   168   184  164 
(percent) (25)    (28)    (23)  (26) 
 
Percent high water  35    36    45  36 
using crops  (17)    (22)    (20)  (19) 
 
Sample  size  69   50   10  129 
   
Source:  R. Z. H. Renfro.  "Economics of local control of irrigation water in 
            Pakistan:  A pilot study".  (Ph. D. diss., Colorado State University, Fort 
           Collins, CO, 1982). 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
* Difference between categories significant at 0.05 probability level. 
 
 
In Faisalabad, the average total cropping intensity for tubewell owners, water purchasers 
and non-tubewell users is 176 percent.  In Jaranwala, where there is no alternative 
irrigation source, tubewell water purchasers have a slightly higher cropping intensity than 
owners (182 compared to 176 percent--though the differences are not significant).  In Dir, 
tubewell owners have the highest average cropping intensity (197 percent), followed by 




The proportion of area under individual crops shows no clear pattern across the 
sample.  For example, tubewell owners in Faisalabad plant more fodder, wheat, and 
sugarcane than other crops, while wheat is the major crop for water purchasers, followed 
by fodder and sugarcane.  Non-tubewell users in Faisalabad plant the greatest proportion 
of their land in sugarcane, an extremely water-consumptive crop, followed by wheat.  In 
Jaranwala, both tubewell owners and water purchasers plant a greater amount of fodder 
than do farmers in other Faisalabad villages.  In Dir, tubewell owners plant 62 percent of 
their land in fodder, while water purchasers (who are largely tenants) plant only 5 percent 
and non-tubewell users plant 21 percent.  Dir farmers, particularly tubewell owners and 
water purchasers, also plant a large area under wheat and maize, as well as substantial 
area under tomato and onion.  Further analysis of the net returns to total farm operations 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to examine the impact of different sources of irrigation on yields, a 
production function was estimated using plot-level data for the 1990-91 agricultural year.  
Due to limited degrees of freedom for other crops in the sample, this equation was 
estimated for wheat only, a staple crop grown by nearly all farmers in both Faisalabad 
and Dir.  Table 14 shows the results of this estimation, using linear regression.
21  Seeding 
rate, total fertilizer applications (defined as kilograms of elemental Nitrogen and 
Phosphorous per acre), total labor inputs, soil characteristics of pH, potassium, 
phosphorous, and salinity are included in the model along with the number of irrigation 
applications from own tubewells, purchased groundwater, and canal water.  Soil pH has 
been transformed to degree of alkalinity, a variable computed by subtracting 7 from to 
the original pH value.
22   Salinity is represented by a dummy variable indicating if 
measured electrical conductivity levels are greater than or equal to 4 millimhos per 
centimeter, the threshold level for average crop tolerance of salinity. 
                                                 
     
21 Alternative functional forms, such as Cobb-Douglas and log-linear, were tested, but did not fit the 
data as well as linear regression.  The large number of cases with values of 0 for one or more of the 
independent variables, notably the irrigation inputs, may account for the poor fit of the Cob-Douglas 
equation.  Quadratic and interaction terms were tested, but found not significant, and are therefore not 
included in the model. 
     




Table 14--Effect of irrigation applications on plot-level wheat yields in Faisalabad 
             and Dir Districts   
 
Independent   Standard  T  Variable 
Variables Coefficient  Error  Statistic  Mean   
 
Seeding rate (kg/acre)  3.60 **  1.82  1.98  40.93 
Fertilizer (N + P kg/acre)  4.67 **  .73  6.09  47.12 
Labor (person-days/acre)  1.89 *  1.12  1.68  27.86 
Degree of alkalinity (adjusted pH)  253.54 **  69.20  3.66  0.62
a 
Soil Potassium (ppm/acre)  1.25 **  .38  3.32  128.14 
Soil Phosphorous (ppm/acre)  -4.50  4.82  -.93  10.07 
Soil salinity dummy  -44.61  68.99  -.65  .13
b 
Canal irrigations  31.14 **  9.00  3.46  2.53 
Purchased tubewell irrigations  44.58 **  16.66  2.68  .62 
Own tubewell irrigations  48.31 **  18.45  2.62  .50 
Constant -63.16  112.20  -.56 
 
 
 Adjusted R Square            =   0.31  **   
 Number of observations      =  263.0                                      
Source: IFPRI survey data, 1990-1992. 
a  Degree of alkalinity = soil pH - 7.0. 
b  Variable equals 1 if electrical conductivity > 4 mmhos/cm, 0 otherwise. 
**  Significant at 5 percent probability level 




The seeding rate and amount of nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizer have a strong 
positive effect on wheat yields.
23  Total labor inputs, including family, exchange, 
permanent hired, and casual hired labor are also associated with higher yields. The level 
of potassium in the soil and degree of soil alkalinity are positively associated with yields.  
Higher pH values influence yields because slightly alkaline soils (those with a pH above 
7.0) are characterized by greater nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium availability.  The 
                                                 
     
23 A single variable for the sum of nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizer is used because the levels of these 
two inputs are multicollinear.  If N and P are included as separate variables in the model, both have 
significant coefficients of approximately the same magnitude as the total fertilizer coefficient (4.4) in the 




coefficients for other soil characteristics--phosphorous content and salinity are not 
significant.   
The lack of a significant effect of electrical conductivity on wheat yields is 
important because in areas of tubewell irrigation, secondary soil salinity induced by large 
amounts of groundwater use is a potential concern (Murray-Rust and Vander Velde 
1992).  Present levels of salinity, which average 0.8 millimhos per centimeter in Dir and 
3.2 millimhos per centimeter in the Faisalabad study area do not appear problematic, but 
higher levels may reduce productivity.   
After controlling for fertilizer input and soil fertility, all three types of irrigation 
inputs had a significant positive effect on wheat yields.  But the magnitude of the 
coefficients indicates that each irrigation application from own tubewells has the highest 
impact on yield, followed by purchased groundwater and canal applications.  
The number of applications is an imperfect indicator of irrigation, because it does 
not control for the volume of water used per application (though the area of crop irrigated 
is controlled for), nor for timing of applications.  The volume of water per application is 
usually lower for tubewell than for canal applications, and therefore would not explain 
the higher productivity of groundwater irrigation.  However, farmers have relatively little 
control over timing under warabandi rotations of canal systems.  Tubewell water can be 
adjusted to the crop needs and growing cycle, and therefore have a greater impact on 
production.   
The estimates of productivity of tubewell irrigation, particularly from own 
tubewells, are influenced by a number of tubewells in Jaranwala, a village within the 




water (except through groundwater recharge).  While it may be argued that this is not 
representative, it is precisely in such areas that tubewell irrigation is likely to be most 
important in agricultural production. 
This production function, which focuses on seeds, fertilizer, labor, soil fertility, 
and irrigation, does not include all influences on productivity, such as weather, seed 
variety and quality, human and physical capital, and even water quality.  There are also 
selection processes underlying farmers’ decisions to invest in tubewells and to purchase 
tubewell water, in addition to factors influencing whether farmers have access to canal 
water, which could be included in the model.  Furthermore, these relationships may differ 
under other agroecological conditions, such as areas with significant salinity problems.  
However, these results show that irrigation, and especially tubewell irrigation, has a 
strong impact on yields among sample farmers in Faisalabad and Dir Districts.  At the 
same time, they point to a productivity gap between the effect of own tubewell water, 
over which farmers have considerable control, and purchased tubewell water, over which 
farmers have less control.  The following section examines factors which affect the 
reliability of purchased tubewell water, in order to identify ways to improve the 
performance of water markets. 
 
6.  RELIABILITY OF IRRIGATION SERVICE  
The productivity of irrigated agriculture is not determined solely by the amount of 
irrigation water supplied.  The timeliness and reliability of water supplies is also critical.  
Timing waterings to meet crop evapotranspirative demand has a direct impact on yield, 




of fertilizer and labor use, and the application of other inputs.  Few studies of water 
markets have addressed the timeliness and reliability of purchased irrigation services, 
especially because they are difficult to quantify and measure.  However, availability of 
water throughout the season, especially at critical times, provides one indicator of 
irrigation service. 
Because tubewell water is not tied to a fixed warabandi rotation schedule, it is 
easier to match tubewell irrigations to crop needs, in order to provide more frequent 
irrigations during periods of peak demand, if necessary.  Tubewell water is also available 
throughout the year, except during periods of mechanical breakdown.  In the IFPRI 
sample, tubewell owners reported that pump or engine failures made groundwater 
unavailable for an average of 2 weeks per season in Faisalabad, and 1 week per season in 
Dir.  This compares favorably with the reported unavailability of canal water for an 
average of 4 weeks per season in Faisalabad and 5 weeks per season in Dir. 
Although the reliability of irrigation service under private tubewells is generally 
higher than under public sources such as canals and government tubewells, it is likely to 
be lower for water purchasers than for farmers with their own wells because tubewell 
owners sell surplus water after meeting the needs of their own crops.  Thus, the deficits 
created by shortages of groundwater or energy supplies are not shared equally between 
owner and purchaser, but rather reduce groundwater availability to purchasers first.  Such 
groundwater shortages compound groundwater unavailability due to mechanical failure 
of pumps, the latter affecting both owners and purchasers. 
Tubewell water sellers and purchasers in the IFPRI sample were asked whether 




responded that water is most likely to be unavailable during periods of electricity 
shortage or load shedding, and during periods of peak water demand.  Not surprisingly, 
the water purchasers were more likely to identify problems with water availability than 
were the water sellers (Table 15).  Over a fourth of Faisalabad water buyers reported that 
they were unable to purchase water to meet crop needs during times of load shedding, 
although no sellers reported being unable to sell because of load shedding.  Times of peak 
demand are more problematic: nearly a fourth of all sellers and over half of all buyers 
reported that purchased tubewell water was not always available when needed during 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What influences the reliability of purchased irrigation water?  Three factors can 
be hypothesized to have an effect: type of tubewell, characteristics of the buyer, and the 
relationship between seller and buyer.  Electric tubewells are more susceptible to power 
outages, and are therefore likely to be less reliable.  Larger-capacity tubewells and those 
which draw water from deeper levels are hypothesized to be more reliable.  Buyers with 
higher social status, indicated by land ownership and age, are also hypothesized to have 
more reliable access to purchased tubewell water.  If social ties influence reliability of 
water markets, farmers who buy water from close relatives or their landlords would be 
expected to receive more reliable irrigation service. 
A logistic regression model has been used to test these hypotheses, using buyers’ 
reported availability of tubewell water whenever needed as an indicator of reliability.  
Dummy variables for Jaranwala village in Faisalabad and for Dir district are included to 
control for agroecological differences between these areas and the rest of the sample 
(most notably the differential availability of canal irrigation).    
Results of the logit model are given in Table 16.  As predicted, electric tubewells 
are significantly less reliable than those with diesel or tractor-powered lifts.
24  Larger-
diameter tubewells were significantly more reliable than smaller ones, but deeper 
tubewells do not provide more reliable irrigation for purchasers--indeed, the coefficient is 
negative, though not significant.  Deeper tubewells may be located in groundwater-scarce 
areas, and therefore provide less reliable supplies to purchasers. 
                                                 
     
24 In an alternate specification of the model, the difference was found between diesel and tractor 




Table 16--Results of logistic regression model for reliability of purchased tubewell 
             water   
 
Independent       Wald 
Variables Units  Coefficient  T  Ratio  Statistic   
 
Electric tubewell  dummy  -2.189 **  -2.934  8.617 
Tubewell diameter  inches  1.267 **  2.368  5.587 
Tubewell depth  feet  -.026  -1.245  1.553 
Size of land ownership  acres  .072 **  1.986  3.949 
Age of household head  years  .045 *  1.844  3.398 
Buy from close relative  dummy  .855  .866  .750 
Buy from landlord  dummy  10.613  .435  .189 
Jaranwala  village  dummy  .668 .726 .527 
Dir district  dummy  4.209 **  2.397  5.745 
Constant   -5.929  *  -1.838  3.378 
 
 
 Model Chi-Square           =  58.2  **  with 9 degrees of freedom 
 Number of observations    =  96.0 
 
 
  Classification Table for Reliability of Purchased Tubewell Water 
 
   Predicted    Percent   
 NOT  RELIABLERELIABLECorrect 
 
 Observed 
   NOT RELIABLE  49    6  89.1 
                     
   RELIABLE  9    32  78.5 
 
                                          Overall  84.4 
   
Source: IFPRI survey data, 1992. 
**  Significant at 5 percent probability level 
*   Significant at 10 percent probability level 
 
The amount of land owned has a significant and positive effect on reliability, 
suggesting that water sellers are less likely to deny requests for water from larger land-
owners than from small landowners or landless tenant cultivators.  This is due to the 
influence of the land owners, not the size of farm operated.  An alternate specification of 




coefficient for size of holding.
25  The age of purchasers’ head of household, another 
indicator of status, has a positive effect on reliability.  The model does not show kinship 
or landlord-tenant relationships between water buyer and seller to have a significant 
effect on reliability of access to groundwater.  Jaranwala village does not differ 
significantly from other areas in reliability of purchased tubewell water, but buyers in Dir 
district reported significantly more reliable access to groundwater.  This is somewhat 
surprising because irrigation is less available in Dir than in the canal-irrigated areas of 
Faisalabad, and therefore demand for groundwater would be expected to be higher.  
However, rainfall is higher in Dir, and therefore groundwater may be more readily 
available to those farmers needing supplemental irrigation. 
While buyers’ reported problems with unavailability of purchased groundwater is 
an imperfect indicator of reliability, this model points to important sources of problems in 
groundwater markets.  Purchasers are more likely to receive insufficient groundwater if 
they buy from small-capacity, electric-powered tubewells; if they are young and own 
little or no land; and if they live in Faisalabad District.  Improving the reliability of 
electric power or switching to diesel pumps are the most readily identifiable interventions 
to improve reliability of groundwater markets (as well as reliability of water for well 
owners).  Both of these options are, however, expensive.  Identifying the factors which 
lead to lower reliability in Faisalabad than in Dir requires further study.   
                                                 
     
25 Both ownership and operational holding size could not be included because of multicollinearity 




Although land ownership and age have strong influences on reliability, they do 
not appear to point to policy interventions that can improve reliability.  Improving the 
reliability of irrigation by increasing the land ownership and age of water-purchasing 
households is not feasible, or even desirable.  However, it may be possible to raise the 
status of purchasers relative to water sellers by encouraging smaller farmers to purchase 
tubewells.  This study does not have data on both the sellers’ and buyers’ characteristics 
for each relationship, but it is possible that farmers with less land will provide more 
reliable service, both because there is less of a status gap between them and the 
purchasers, and because tubewell owners with less land will not need as much water to 
meet irrigation needs on their own fields, and thus have surplus water available for sale. 
 
  7.  RESEARCH AND POLICY MEASURES FOR WATER MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT  
Water markets are largely autonomous, indigenous institutions which function--
and are likely to continue functioning--without a great deal of official intervention.  What 
type of attention, if any, should the government, researchers, and other agencies pay to 
water markets?  This final section highlights policy instruments and remaining research 
questions pertaining to water market development. 
First, understanding the role water markets play in mediating access to and 
control over groundwater resources can assist tubewell development programs in serving 
a larger number of farmers.  This study indicates that water markets improve the equity of 
groundwater use by increasing the access of small farmers, tenants, and younger 




ownership of tubewells by all farmers are required to ensure widespread use of 
groundwater in areas where water markets operate.   
However, the study also demonstrates that water markets do not operate in all 
areas, raising the question of which factors influence the activity of water markets.  
Conditions that affect the amount of groundwater available for sale include the number of 
tubewells in an area, the proportion of tubewell owners willing to sell water, and the 
nature of the underlying groundwater resource.  Because, with current technology, water 
cannot be transported over large distances, wells must be available within close proximity 
to buyers’ fields for groundwater markets to operate.  Chambers, Saxena and Shah (1989) 
suggest that a higher density of tubewells fosters the development of competitive water 
markets.  Thus, programs which assist private tubewell development, especially in areas 
of adequate, good-quality groundwater, are also likely to assist water market 
development. 
Making information about water markets more widely available both to 
individuals and groups of farmers may also stimulate further investment in tubewells.  
For example, knowledge of the potential for groundwater sales in a given area, different 
credit options for investment and contractual arrangements for water sales could be an 
important decision-making tool for potential investors.  This information could be 
gathered and disseminated by local groups, non-governmental organizations or projects 
such as the Private Tubewell Development Project. 
Due to the small sample of tubewell owners, this study was not able to determine 
factors affecting which tubewell owners will sell water.  Possible factors influencing the 




cropping patterns, as well as tubewell technology and energy costs.  Further research on 
this topic, as well as on the nature of the specific transactions occurring between buyers 
and sellers, would be useful in stimulating water markets. 
As noted above, large farmers are most likely to own tubewells, while small 
farmers are more likely to depend on water purchases, and consequently face less reliable 
access to groundwater.  However, larger farmers are also able to use more of their 
tubewell water on their own land.  Tubewell owners with smaller holdings may be more 
likely to sell water, because they have surplus capacity beyond what is needed to irrigate 
their holdings.  Those with less land may also rely more on water sales to recoup their 
investment in the well and pumpset, and hence be more concerned with providing reliable 
irrigation services to others.  Thus, targeting farmers with smaller holdings for tubewell 
purchase could increase participation in water markets and the reliability of tubewell 
water deliveries for buyers.   
Credit and other types of assistance for tubewell investment are available to small 
farmers (though not to landless tenants).  The Agricultural Development Bank requires 
ownership of only 3 acres in a consolidated area to receive credit for tubewells, and has a 
lower requirement of equity contribution for smaller farmers.  However, analysis by 
Malik, Broca, and Gill (1992) indicates that institutional credit does not reach many small 
farmer households.  Efforts are needed to ensure that smallholders actually receive 
assistance.  These efforts can include simplifying application forms and procedures for 
receiving credit, electricity connections, and technical assistance. 
Tubewell technology and energy costs are also likely to affect owners’ willingness 




with lower investment and operations costs may be preferable for small farmers).  
Electric-powered pumps generally have lower operation and maintenance costs compared 
to diesel and tractor-powered lifts.  A flat rate power tariff structure, under which the 
tubewell owner pays a monthly fee per horsepower of the motor regardless of the 
quantity of electricity consumed, reduces the marginal cost of pumping to virtually zero, 
and therefore creates an incentive to sell as much water as possible (Shah 1992).  
However, a high fixed monthly cost of electricity may also be a deterrent to investment 
by small farmers who are unsure of their ability to sell enough water throughout the year.  
WAPDA calculations for the Private Tubewell Development Project indicate that the flat 
rate tariff is the cheapest source of energy for pumping if farmers use an average 20 
percent of pump capacity.  But, given the fluctuations in demand for tubewell water (both 
on owners’ farms and through water markets) maintaining an average 20 percent of 
capacity throughout the year is often difficult.   
A major drawback to electric-powered tubewells is their susceptibility to 
fluctuations in power supply.  If power is not available for much of the time, it does not 
matter if the marginal cost of energy is nearly zero.  What is more relevant to tubewell 
owners’ decisions to sell water is the opportunity cost of the water which could be 
pumped and applied to their own fields.  As long as tubewell owners only sell surplus 
water above their own needs, rather than selling water as an enterprise in itself, shortages 
of tubewell water due to load shedding will be disproportionately borne by the purchasers 
rather than by well owners.  Rationing and uncertainty of power supply translates into 
rationing of groundwater available for sale.  Diesel may be relatively more expensive, but 




above, purchasers from electric tubewells report more problems than those who buy from 
diesel tubewells.  Thus, extending electricity grids and making it easier for farmers to 
obtain connections for tubewells can assist in development of water markets, but only if 
the power supply is also reliable.  Further study is needed to determine which factors, 
besides improved electricity supplies, can increase the reliability of groundwater 
irrigation services, particularly for small farmers.   
Joint investment in a well by a group of farmers may be another viable means of 
making groundwater available to a large number of farmers, including small farmers and 
tenants.  This study found 15 of 18 wells to be jointly owned by groups of 5 to 12 farmers 
in Jaranwala village, where there is heavy dependence on groundwater.  Environmental 
differences between this village and other study areas do not allow direct comparison of 
the costs and quality of irrigation service between jointly-owned wells and water markets 
from individually-owned wells, but further research could address the relative merits of 
each system.
26  There are likely to be difficulties in organizing and maintaining a group of 
joint owners, but there may also be substantial benefits in terms of irrigation service and 
risk-sharing.  Joint ownership may also allow optimal location of wells in terms of 
tapping good quality groundwater and being able to serve the maximum number of 
farmers (such as near the head of a watercourse).  Efforts to establish well ownership in 
conjunction with water users’ associations (as in some areas under the On Farm Water 
Management Program or the PATA project in NWFP) merit further examination.   
                                                 
     
26 Jointly-owned wells are not incompatible with water markets (as seen in the Jaranwala study village).  




Many of the credit and subsidy programs to encourage private tubewell 
development have focussed on wells and pumping equipment.  The contribution of lined 
channels and pipes to the development of groundwater irrigation in general, and water 
markets in particular, has been largely overlooked.  Lining delivery channels to reduce 
water losses extends the effective command area of tubewells.  At present there is little 
private investment in lined conveyance or pipes for tubewell water in Pakistan, but pukka 
watercourses are important.  In the IFPRI sample, lined watercourses in canal command 
areas allowed water to be conveyed over distances of 1 to 3 kilometers from the tubewell 
to the purchaser’s plot.  The watercourse rehabilitation and lining done under the On 
Farm Water Management and related projects can, therefore, not only contribute to canal 
irrigation performance, but also provide infrastructure to assist the development of water 
markets.  In many areas, lining is no longer cost-effective in terms of reducing canal 
water losses.  But if savings of relatively more expensive (and high-value) tubewell water 
are included, watercourse lining may be more attractive.  Using lined watercourses for 
tubewell water can also increase farmers’ incentives to maintain the watercourses.  
However, regulations (especially under the Canal and Drainage Act) should be re-
examined to see if they pose unnecessary restrictions on the use of watercourses for 
tubewell water. 
Because of their importance in expanding access to and use of groundwater 
irrigation, it is important to improve our understanding of water markets and their 
linkages to crop choice, agricultural productivity and resource sustainability.  Results of 
this and other studies demonstrate that purchased irrigation makes a significant 




purchased groundwater.  The greater control of irrigation afforded by tubewell ownership 
is likely to be a major factor in this, but further study is needed to assess how this affects 
overall cropping patterns and farm incomes.   
Much of the empirical work on water markets in Pakistan to date has been in 
relatively favorable conditions:  fresh groundwater areas, and areas where recharge 
equals or exceeds groundwater withdrawals.  The incentive and managerial problems of 
getting farmers to pump and purchase groundwater where it is so saline that it has to be 
mixed with canal flows are considerable, and may require continued state intervention 
through public tubewells.  Where waterlogging (but not salinity) is a problem, developing 
water markets can help to control rising water tables.  In areas where groundwater is in 
scarce supply, water markets may encourage overexploitation of the resource, and thus 
need to be monitored and, if possible, regulated.  If tubewell owners reserve first use of 
groundwater to meet their own crop needs before selling water to others, groundwater 
scarcity is likely to exacerbate problems of unreliability for water purchasers.  Research 
is needed on how water markets work in these less favorable environments, and to 
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Appendix Table 1--Participation in tubewell water market in Punjab mixed 
cropping zone, by size of land ownership   
 
                   Total Land Ownership                  
 <1  1-5  6-12  13-25  26-50  >50  Total 
  acre  acres  acres acres acres  acres 
   
 
Tubewell  owner  0 15  17 33 12  12  89 
  (0.0) (44.1)  (48.6) (91.7) (70.6)  (85.7)  (65.0) 
 
Tubewell  water  1  11  9 2 4  1  28 
   buyer  (100.0)  (32.4)  (25.7)  (5.6)  (23.5)  (7.1)  (20.4) 
 
Total  sample  size  1 34  35 36 17  14  137 
   
Source:  National Input Output survey data, Agricultural University of Faisalabad, 
            1991/92. 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are percentage of farmers in each size category who 
         own tubewell or purchase tubewell water. 
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